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A DEVELOPER'S DREAM: THE UNITED STATES 
CLAIMS COURT'S NEW ANALYSIS OF SECTION 404 
TAKINGS CHALLENGES 
Thomas H anley* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following scenario: a development company pur-
chases a 100-acre parcel of waterfront property on which it plans to 
build a residential community. Five acres of this parcel are wetlands 
that are interconnected with the local water supply. The company 
successfully develops and sells fifty of its dry acres, enjoying a 
substantial return on its original investment. The company then 
transfers title to the forty-five unsold dry acres, leaving in its own 
name only the five wetland acres. Years later, the company applies 
to the federal government, as required under section 404 of the 
Clean Water Act (CW A), 1 for a permit to fill the remaining five acres 
of wetlands. The company was fully aware of the section 404 permit 
requirement when it acquired the property. 
If the government denies the company a fill permit, must the 
government compensate the company for the profits that it expected 
to realize by developing the wetlands? A decade ago, probably not. 
Today, however, the government likely would be forced to pay the 
developer, despite the harm that would have resulted from the wet-
lands destruction, despite the substantial profits the company al-
ready has reaped from its initial investment and the profits the forty-
• Executive Editor, 1991-1992, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW RE-
VIEW. 
I 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988); see infra notes 23-51 and accompanying text. 
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five separately held acres likely will yield upon development, and 
despite the permit denial's foreseeability when the company first 
acquired its property. Why this result? The answer lies with the 
United States Claims Court and its new approach to section 404 
takings challenges. 
CW A section 404 prohibits the discharge of dredged or fill material 
into waters of the United States without a permit. 2 The goal of the 
section 404 program is that of the CWA itself: "to restore and main-
tain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's 
waters. "3 The fundamental policy underlying section 404 is to pre-
vent the ecological harm that results from water pollution and en-
vironmental despoilment. 4 
Land developers frequently challenge section 404 under the Fifth 
Amendment's prohibition against governmental taking of private 
property without just compensation. 5 Typically, developers allege 
that the government's6 denial of a section 404 dredge and fill permit 
constitutes a taking of their property, because the regulation pre-
vents the developers from obtaining any practical use or value from 
their land. 7 
2 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1988). The Anny Corps of Engineers regulations define "dredged 
material" as any "material that is excavated or dredged from the waters ofthe United States." 
33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1990). "Fill material" means "any material used for the primary purpose 
of replacing an aquatic area with dry land or of changing the bottom elevation of a waterbody." 
[d. § 323.2(e). 
3 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988). 
4 See infra notes 29-41 and accompanying text. 
5 The so-called "takings," or just compensation, clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, 
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V; see infra notes 68-125 and accompanying 
text. 
6 The Anny Corps of Engineers is the governmental agency responsible for issuing § 404 
permits. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. 
7 See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 154 (1990); Florida 
Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 164 (1990); Formanek v. United States, 
18 Cl. Ct. 785, 787 (1989); Ciampetti v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 548, 550 (1989); Laney v. 
United States, 661 F.2d 145, 147 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Jentgen v. United States, 657 F.2d 1210, 1212 
(Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 
1184, 1189 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982). 
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The United States Claims Court8 is usually the forum for section 
404 takings challenges. 9 In determining whether a section 404 permit 
denial amounts to a taking, the Claims Court balances the public 
interest in preserving the wetlands at issue against the regulation's 
economic impact on the private property owner.l0 Traditionally, the 
public interest weighed heavily in the court's analysis; the court 
assumed that section 404 substantially advanced the government's 
legitimate interest in protecting the environment. 11 In addition, the 
court considered a section 404 permit denial's economic impact on 
the claimant in light of the claimant's original property investment. 12 
Finally, the court intimated that claimants would not win their tak-
ings claims if they were on notice of the section 404 permit require-
ment when they purchased their property.13 Landowners could suc-
ceed in their regulatory takings claims only in extreme 
circumstances. 14 
Recently, however, the Claims Court has adopted a new approach 
to section 404 takings claims.15 In examining section 404's purpose, 
the court no longer assumes that the regulation advances important 
federal interests. 16 Moreover, in determining section 404's economic 
8 The United States Claims Court originally was known as the United States Court of 
Claims. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 22, 10 Stat. 612. In 1982, Congress reorganized the court 
under the Federal Courts Improvement Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 171-177, 1491 (1988). The 1982 
Amendments substituted the name "United States Claims Court" for "Court of Claims." Id. 
This Comment refers to both the United States Court of Claims and the United States Claims 
Court as the "Claims Court." 
The Claims Court has jurisdiction to render judgment upon "any claim against the United 
States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an 
executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for 
liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." Id. § 1491(a)(1). See 
generally WILSON COWEN ET. AL., THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS, A HISTORY, 
PART II, ORIGIN-DEVELOPMENT-JURISDICTION, 1855-1978 (Committee on the Bicentennial 
of Independence and the Constitution of the Judicial Conference of the United States) (1976) 
reprinted in 216 Ct. Cl. 1 (1978); Philip R. Miller, The New United States Claims Court, 32 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 7 (1983-84); Harold C. Petrowitz, Federal Court Reform: The Federal 
Courts Improvement Act of 1982-and Beyond, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 543 (1983). 
9 See infra notes 55-67 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra text accompanying notes 144-249. 
11 See infra text accompanying notes 146-71. 
12 See infra text accompanying note 151. 
13 See infra text accompanying notes 158-62. 
14 See Deltona v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1194 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 
1017 (1982) (in takings cases involving governmental regulations that substantially advance 
legitimate public interests, plaintiffs face a "very difficult prospect" of establishing takings). 
15 See infra text accompanying notes 173-249. 
16 See infra text accompanying notes 221-25. 
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impact upon a claimant's property, the court has limited its analysis 
solely to the contiguous property held by the claimant when the 
government denied the section 404 permit. 17 Finally, in considering 
section 404's interference with the claimant's reasonable investment-
backed expectations,18 the court has suggested that it may find a 
taking even in the absence of such expectations. 19 
This Comment argues that the Claims Court's new takings anal-
ysis is flawed for three reasons. First, in refusing to consider the 
environmental harm caused by destroying wetlands, the court has 
lost sight of Congress's intent in promulgating section 404. Second, 
the Claims Court has misinterpreted the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. De-
Benedictis20 by restricting the property considered in its economic 
impact analysis. The court's limited focus has enabled developers to 
manipulate their property holdings so as virtually to ensure that, if 
their section 404 permit application is denied, a taking will be found. 
Third, the court has contradicted its own holdings and those of the 
Supreme Court by suggesting that it may find a taking absent a 
claimant's reasonable investment-backed expectations. 
This Comment does not suggest a precise formula for determining 
where a section 404 regulation ends and a constitutional taking be-
gins. 21 Rather, it advocates that the Claims Court should use the 
Supreme Court's current regulatory takings analysis, which balances 
the public and private interests involved in a governmental regula-
tion. 22 In performing this analysis, the Claims Court should readopt 
the traditional assumptions it made in its early section 404 takings 
decisions. Specifically, in examining section 404's purpose, the Claims 
Court should presume that a section 404 permit denial substantially 
advances legitimate public interests in preventing environmental 
harm, and should accord significant weight to these interests in its 
analysis. In determining a permit denial's economic impact upon a 
claimant's property, the court should broaden its analysis to consider 
the uses derived from the unregulated portions of the claimant's 
original property investment. Finally, in considering the claimant's 
investment-backed expectations, the court should not compensate 
claimants who were on notice of the section 404 permit requirement 
17 See infra text accompanying notes 232--35. 
18 See infra text accompanying notes 119--35. 
19 See infra text accompanying notes 248-49. 
20 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
21 See infra note 76 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 82-125 and accompanying text. 
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when they acquired the property that the regulation allegedly has 
taken. 
Section II of this Comment provides a brief overview of the section 
404 program. Section III explains the basis of the Claims Court's 
jurisdiction to hear section 404 takings cases. Section IV introduces 
the traditional analyses that courts have used in deciding regulatory 
takings claims, and explains the Supreme Court's current approach 
to the regulatory takings problem. Section V examines the Claims 
Court's original and present approaches to section 404 takings 
claims. Finally, Section VI argues why the Claims Court's current 
section 404 takings analysis is flawed, and proposes an approach that 
the court should use in deciding section 404 takings claims. 
II. THE SECTION 404 PROGRAM: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
A. Section J"OJ/s Purpose 
In 1972, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act Amendments23 to protect the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the nation's waters.24 The amendments, now known as 
the Clean Water Act,25 established a national goal of eliminating the 
discharge of pollutants into navigable waters.26 To combat such pol-
lution, Congress instituted CWA section 404 to regulate the dis-
charge of dredged and fill material into waters of the United States. 27 
The CWA makes it unlawful to discharge dredged or fill material 
into the nation's waters without the permit that section 404 re-
quires. 28 
23 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988). Congress passed the original Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act (FWPCA) in 1948. Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155. The 1948 FWPCA 
left the states primary responsibility in controlling water pollution. Id. Although Congress 
amended FWPCA eleven times before 1972, no amendment proved effective in solving water 
pollution problems, prompting Congress to enact the 1972 amendments. S. REP. No. 414, 
92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 97 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3669-77. The 1972 
FWPCA's purpose was to "enhance the quality and value of our water resources and to 
establish a national policy for the prevention, control, and abatement of water pollution." 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3678. 
24 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988). 
25 Congress amended FWPCA again in 1977. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977) 
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988». The 1977 Amendments stated that 
the entire Act may be referred to as the Clean Water Act. 91 Stat. 1566, 1566 (1977). 
26 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1988). 
?:7 Id. § 1344. The Act applies to all of the nation's "navigable waters," which the Act defines 
as "waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." Id. § 1362(7); see infra note 
42 discussing the expansion of the Corps's § 404 jurisdiction. 
28 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1988). 
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The primary objectives of section 404 are those of the CWA itself: 
to eliminate water pollution and to provide water quality sufficient 
to protect wildlife, marine organisms,29 and human health. 30 Land-
owners cannot obtain a section 404 permit if discharge from their 
proposed activities will degrade water quality enough to harm the 
environment. 31 
In addition, several federal agencies and special interest groups 
consider section 404 a legislative mechanism to protect wetlands. 32 
Wetlands are valuable both for their intrinsic qualities33 and their 
ecological functions. 34 Wetlands are an endangered natural resource, 
disappearing at a rate of over 300 acres every year.35 Section 404 is 
one means by which the government can limit wetland destruction. 
At the time of section 404's enactment, Congress was chiefly con-
cerned with reducing pollution in navigable waters.36 In defining 
"navigable waters" as "waters of the United States,"37 Congress 
intended to give the CW A the broadest possible scope over all the 
nation's waters, including wetlands. 38 When Congress passed the 
1977 amendments to the CWA, many legislators acknowledged sec-
29 Id. § 1251(a)(1) (1988). 
30 40 C.F.R. § 230.IO(c)(I) (1990). 
31 See id. 
32 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESSIONAL BOARD OF THE 98TH CONGRESS, 
WETLANDS: THEIR USE AND REGULATION 10 (1984) [hereinafter OTA REPORT]. Federal 
agencies and special interest groups once were divided on their interpretation of § 404's intent 
regarding wetlands. Id. The Corps viewed § 404 as a means solely to protect water quality. 
Id. The Environmental Protection Agency, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Marine 
Fisheries Service, and various environmental groups, however, consider § 404 a legislative 
mechanism to preserve wetlands for their habitat and aesthetic values as well as for their 
water purification utility. I d. 
33 Intrinsic qualities of wetlands include their historical, aesthetic, and recreational values. 
Id. at 37. 
34 Id. The ecological services wetlands provide include pollution abatement, flood reduction, 
ground water recharge, water quality improvement, food chain support, fish and wildlife 
habitat, and shoreline stabilization. Id.; see a.lso COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 
OUR NATION'S WETLANDS 19-21 (1978). 
35 OTA REPORT, supra note 32, at 11. Over 50% of the nation's wetland areas have been 
destroyed in the last two centuries. NAT'L WETLANDS INVENTORY, FISH AND WILDLIFE 
SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, WETLANDS OF THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT STATUS 
AND RECENT TRENDS 2 (1984). 
36 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1465, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 138 (1972) (§ 404 to apply to freshwater 
lakes and streams). 
37 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1988). 
38 S. REP. No. 1236, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 144 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3776,3822; H.R. REP. No. 911, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 131 (1972); see also Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975) (the term "navigable 
waters" as used in CWA not limited to the Corps's traditional navigability tests). 
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tion 404 as a wetlands protection mechanism. 39 Controversy contin-
ues as to whether the government should use section 404 to preserve 
wetlands as well as to prevent water pollution. 40 Both purposes, 
however, advance the public's interest in preventing environmental 
harm.41 
B. The Section 40.4 Permit Process 
The CWA gives the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) responsi-
bility for conducting reviews of section 404 permit applications. 42 
The Corps's permit review process follows guidelines developed by 
the Secretary of the Army, 43 the Environmental Protection 
Agency,44 the Fish and Wildlife Service,45 the National Marine Fish-
eries Service,46 and the interstate water pollution control agency 
with jurisdiction over the waters where the discharge will occur. 47 
The Corps's final decision regarding whether to issue a section 404 
permit results from a balancing of the project's potential benefits 
and detriments. 48 In a detailed, extensive evaluation process known 
as the "public interest review,"49 the Corps considers a variety of 
39 See, e.g., 123 CONGo REC. 26,697 (1977) (Senator Edmund Muskie commenting that "[tlhe 
unregulated destruction of [wetlandl areas is a matter which needs to be corrected and which 
implementation of § 404 has attempted to achieve"); Oversight Hearings on Section 404 of the 
Clean Water Act Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on 
Environment and Public Works, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1985) (Senator John Chafee com-
menting that "[tlhe Section 404 Dredge and Fill Program is the most important regulatory 
tool the Federal Government has to stem the loss of wetlands"). 
For further commentary on § 404's role as a necessary wetlands protection mechanism, see 
Charles D. Ablard and Brian B. O'Neill, Wetland Protection and Section 404 of the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972: A Corps of Engineers Renaissance, 1 VT. 
L. REV. 51 (1976); Michael C. Blumm, Wetlands Preservation, Fish and Wildlife Protection, 
and 404 Regulation: A Response, 18 LAND & WATER L. REV. 469 (1983). 
40 See supra note 39. 
41 See NoHan V. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); Deltona Corp. V. 
United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1192 (Ct. Cl. 1981) cert. denied 455 U.S. 1017 (1982). 
42 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(d) (1988). Prior to the CWA, the Corps had administered a permit 
program under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. Rivers & Harbors Act, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 
1121 (1899) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-416 (1988». Because of the Corps's 
experience with this permit system, Congress gave the Corps responsibility over the § 404 
program. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., A Legis-
lative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 177 (Comm. Print 
1973). 
43 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (1988) . 
.. [d.; see also 40 C.F.R. § 230 (1990). 
45 See 33 C.F.R. § 320.3(e) (1990). 
46 [d. § 320.3(i). 
47 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1988). 
48 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (1990). 
49 [d. 
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factors related to public welfare and necessity, including natural 
resource conservation, human health and safety, land use, and prop-
erty ownership. 50 If the Corps determines that the proposed project 
will affect the public interest adversely, it must deny the applicant 
a section 404 permit. 51 
III. CHALLENGING A SECTION 404 PERMIT DENIAL IN THE 
CLAIMS COURT 
There are two primary challenges that section 404 permit appli-
cants may raise against a permit denial. First, applicants may con-
test the validity of the Corps's decision to withhold a section 404 
permit under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in a United 
States district court. 52 If the applicant's proposed activities will not 
cause water pollution, then the Corps has no statutory authority to 
act. 53 In such a case, the district court would invalidate the permit 
denial. 54 
Second, applicants may argue that, by denying a section 404 per-
mit to develop their property, the government has taken their prop-
erty without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment. 55 Under the Tucker Act, applicants raising this claim may sue 
the government for payment in the United States Claims Court. 56 
The Tucker Act vests the Claims Court with exclusive jurisdiction 
to hear all claims founded upon the Constitution for which plaintiffs 
seek judgment against the United States in excess of $10,000. 57 
60 Id. The Corps considers the following factors in its public interest review: 
conservation, economics, aesthetics, general environmental concerns, wetlands, his-
toric properties, fish and wildlife values, flood hazards, floodplain values, land use, 
navigation, shore erosion and accretion, recreation, water supply and conservation, 
water quality, energy needs, safety, food and fiber production, mineral needs, con-
siderations of property ownership and, in general, the needs and welfare of the 
people. 
Id. § 320.4(a)(I). 
51 Id. Of the approximately 11,000 project applications that the Corps reviews each year, 
it denies slightly less than 3%, significantly modifies about 33%, and approves about 50% 
without modification; about 14% are withdrawn by applicants. OTA REPORT, supra note 32, 
at 11. 
62 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988); e.g., Deltona Corp. v. Alexander, 504 F. Supp. 1280, 
1284 (M.D. Fla. 1981), aff'd, 682 F.2d 888 (lIth Cir. 1982). 
63 Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986), eert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987), aff'd on rerruJ,nd, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990). 
54 Id. 
55 See supra note 7. 
66 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1988). See also supra note 8. 
57 See supra note 56. 
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When the government takes private property, the property owner 
may file an action in the Claims Court under the Tucker Act, even 
though the government has not proceeded by condemnation. 58 The 
property owner's right of action is founded on the Fifth Amendment 
and needs no other express statutory authority. 59 A Tucker Act suit, 
however, is not available to plaintiffs seeking to recover damages 
for unauthorized government acts.60 Thus, by electing to bring a suit 
under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff in a section 404 permit denial action 
concedes the permit denial's validity, even without a prior validity 
test under the AP A.61 
District courts usually have deferred to the Claims Court in de-
ciding section 404 takings challenges. In American Dredging Co. v. 
Dutchyshyn,62 for example, the District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania declined to determine whether a section 404 
permit modification amounted to a taking. 63 Although the plaintiff 
sought only injunctive relief from the section 404 restrictions, the 
court concluded that the actual thrust of the plaintiff's claim was 
that the permit modification was a taking without just compensation. 
Because monetary damages appeared to be involved, the court de-
termined that the plaintiff's claim was a matter for the Claims 
Court. 64 
Parties may appeal Claims Court decisions to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit).65 The 
Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals from final 
Claims Court decisions,66 and Federal Circuit decisions are binding 
upon the Claims Court. 67 Because the Claims Court hears most 
68 See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 154 (1990); Florida 
Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 164 (1990); Formanek v. United States, 
18 Cl. Ct. 785, 787 (1989); Ciampetti v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 548, 550 (1989); Laney v. 
United States, 661 F.2d 145, 147 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Jentgen v. United States, 657 F.2d 1210, 1212 
(Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 
1184, 1189 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982). 
59 Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987), aff'd on remand, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 899. 
62 480 F. Supp. 957 (E.D. Pa. 1979). 
63 Id. at 962. 
64 Id. 
65 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (1988). The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 created the 
Federal Circuit. Id. § 1295. Prior to the Act's passage, the Claims Court operated on both a 
trial and appellate level. Id. § 792 (repealed 1982). The Act delegated the Claims Court's 
appellate functions to the new Federal Circuit. Id. § 1295(a)(3). 
66 Id. 
67 See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 388 (1988). 
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section 404 takings claims, its section 404 decisions, together with 
those of the Federal Circuit, are the focus of this Comment. Until 
the Supreme Court considers a section 404 takings claim or provides 
a universal formula for regulatory takings analyses, the Claims 
Court and the Federal Circuit will continue to be the pivotal forums 
in which the section 404 program's immediate fate may be decided. 
IV. THE REGULATORY TAKINGS CLAIM: EARLY AND MODERN 
ApPROACHES 
The Fifth Amendment's due process and just compensation clauses 
limit government regulation of land use. 68 The due process clause 
provides that "[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law. "69 The just compensation, or 
takings, clause provides that "private property [shall not] be taken 
for public use, without just compensation. "70 
Courts originally analyzed federal government regulations under 
the due process clause. 71 To be valid, governmental actions had to 
bear a substantial relation to proper governmental purposes. 72 
Courts nullified regulations that failed to meet these substantive due 
process requirements. 73 
Eventually courts adopted the notion that a governmental agen-
cy's exercise of regulatory power also can take property in violation 
of the Fifth Amendment's just compensation clause. Whereas most 
early jurists recognized that the government could "take" property 
68 See infra notes 86-125 and accompanying text. 
69 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment limits the exercise of powers delegated 
to the federal government. The exercise of powers reserved to the states, known as "police 
powers," is limited by state constitutional provisions and by the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, which provides that "[n]o state shall ... deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws." Id. amend. XIV. 
70 Id. amend V. 
71 See infra notes 72-73. 
7'~ See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662 (1887); see also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 
502, 525 (1934); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); Lawton v. 
Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894); infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text. 
711 See, e.g., Lawton, 152 U.S. at 137. In Lawton, the Supreme Court made what scholars 
long have considered the classic statement of what due process requires when it explained 
that a pUrported police power exercise does not violate the due process clause if it appears, 
"first, that the interests of the public . . . require such interference; and second, that the 
means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the pUrpose, and not unduly 
oppressive upon individuals." Id. 
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only by formal condemnation74 or physical invasion,75 later courts 
acknowledged that, if a governmental regulation so severely inter-
fered with property interests as to have the same effect as a physical 
appropriation, the regulation would be a taking. 76 Under the takings 
clause, the remedy for excessive governmental regulation is not 
invalidation of the regulation, but compensation. 77 
In resolving land use regulation problems under the takings 
clause, most courts have integrated both traditional substantive due 
process principles and takings principles into their analyses. 78 The 
result has been a balancing test that requires a comparison of a 
regulation's purpose with its impact upon the claimant's property. 79 
If a court concludes that the net social gains from the regulation 
outweigh the economic loss to the individual landowner, the court 
will not consider the regulation to have "taken" that claimant's prop-
74 Pursuant to its eminent domain power, the government formally can condemn a land-
owner's property and obtain a fee simple interest in the property. See, e.g., United States v. 
Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 255 (1980); see also PHILIP NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 25.41 (3d 
rev. ed. 1972). 
Some early jurists did recognize that a taking could occur without acquisition of a property 
interest. See, e.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 181 (1871) (Miller, J., dissenting). 
The majority of early courts, however, found that takings occurred only when the government 
physically appropriated the property at issue for state use. See, e.g., Fitchburg R.R. v. Boston 
& Maine R.R., 57 Mass. 58, 90 (1849); Canal Appraisers v. People, 17 Wend. 571, 628 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1836). 
75 In the absence of formal condemnation proceedings, the government may interfere so 
substantially with property interests as to have the same effect as an appropriation by eminent 
domain. See DONALD G. HAGMAN & JULIAN C. JUERGENSJI1EYER, URBAN PLANNING AND 
LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 320-21 (1975). In such a case, the landowner may bring 
an "inverse condemnation" action against the government to recover compensation for the 
taken property. Clarke, 445 U.S. at 257; see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 
164, 180 (1979); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 259 (1946); Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 171. 
76 See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 322 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978); 
United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393, 415 (1922). The idea that excessive regulation can constitute a "taking" under the 
just compensation clause is based largely on Pennsylvania Coal. See 260 U.S. at 415. Writing 
for the majority, Justice Holmes stated the following. "The general rule at least is, that while 
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized 
as a taking." [d. The rationale, as Justice Brennan later stated it in San Diego Gas & Electric 
Co. v. San Diego, is that "[p]olice power regulations such as zoning ordinances and other land-
use restrictions can destroy the use and enjoyment of property in order to promote the public 
good just as effectively as formal condemnation or physical invasion of property." 450 U.S. 
621,652 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
77 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
7l! See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
79 See id. 
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erty.80 If the private economic loss outweighs the social gains, the 
court will find a taking for which the government must compensate 
the landowner. 81 
To date, there is no set formula for determining where a regulation 
ends and a taking begins.82 Instead, for all its imprecision, the bal-
ancing test has endured as the primary means by which courts 
resolve takings questions.83 As the Supreme Court itself has ex-
plained, the question of whether a governmental action effects a 
taking necessarily requires a weighing of public and private inter-
ests. 84 In its regulatory takings analysis, the Supreme Court focuses 
both on whether the regulation substantially advances legitimate 
public interests and on whether the regulation denies property own-
ers economically viable use of their land. 85 
In Mugler v. Kansas,86 the Supreme Court used the due process 
clause to analyze a state law prohibiting the manufacture and sale 
of alcoholic beverages. 87 The Court focused both on the legitimacy 
of the regulation's purpose and the regulation's efficacy in accom-
plishing that purpose. 88 It recognized that laws bearing "no real or 
substantial relation" to their proper objectives violated the due pro-
cess clause. 89 Although the Court did not define exactly what pur-
poses are proper, it affirmed the legitimacy of legislation for the 
protection of public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. 90 
In examining a regulation's purpose under the takings clause, the 
Court continues to make what amounts to a Mugler-style due process 
80 See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 506 (1987); 
Agins, 447 U.S. at 262; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926). 
81 See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979); Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). 
82 This familiar language comes from Justice Clark, writing for the majority in Goldblatt 
v. Town oj Hempstead. 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New 
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175. 
83 See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still A Muddle, 57 
S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 566-69 (1984); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE 
L.J. 36, 60 (1964); see generally RICHARD A. EpSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND 
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fair-
ness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations oj "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 
1165 (1967). 
84 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980). 
85 Id. at 260. 
86 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
87 See id. at 655. 
88 Id. at 661. 
89 Id. The Mugler Court was determining whether the regulation at issue violated the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. at 657. 
Federal statutes are analyzed under ·the Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
90 Id. at 661. 
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analysis. In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,91 the Court 
mandated that there be a "nexus" between a regulation and its 
purported goal. 92 Regarding the purpose itself, the Court acknowl-
edged a broad range of permissible ends, from classic objectives such 
as environmental protection93 and public safety,94 to contemporary 
purposes including landmark preservation95 and residential zoning. 96 
In the Court's view, if a regulation failed to SUbstantially advance a 
legitimate governmental interest, it would violate the takings 
clause. 97 
While the Court has been quick to find that regulations serving 
no legitimate purpose violate the takings clause,98 it repeatedly has 
upheld regulations that advance legitimate and compelling public 
interests, even where these regulations destroyed or adversely af-
fected real property interests. 99 In Keystone Bituminous Coal As-
sociation v. DeBenedictis,100 the Court emphasized that the nature 
of the government's interest in the regulation is a critical factor in 
determining whether a taking has occurred.101 The Keystone case 
involved a state statute that restricted the claimant's coal mining 
operations in order to prevent subsidence damage to public buildings 
and homes. 102 Despite the claimant's economic loss, the Court refused 
to find a taking where the state merely restrains uses of property 
that are tantamount to public nuisances.103 The Court maintained 
that, while a regulation's economic impact is important to a regula-
tory takings analysis, it is not conclusive;l04 the regulation's legiti-
91 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
92 [d. at 837. 
93 [d. at 835 (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)). 
94 See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661. 
95 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 
109 (1978». 
96 [d. (citing Euclid, 272 U.S. at 379). 
97 [d. at 837. 
!18 See id. at 843-44. 
99 E.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488 n.18 (1987); 
see also Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227-28 (1986); Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978); Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 
426 U.S. 668, 679 (1976); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 598 (1962); Gorieb v. Fox, 
274 U.S. 603, 610 (1927); Euclid, 272 U.S. at 397; Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 108 (1909). 
100 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
101 [d. at 488. 
102 [d. at 474-76. 
103 [d. at 491. The Court explained that "all property in this country is held under the 
implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community .... " [d. 
at 491-92 (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887)). 
104 [d. at 490 (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)); see also Village of 
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mate public purpose must weigh heavily in the balance against any 
private interests that the regulation affects. 105 
In considering a regulation's effect on property's economic viabil-
ity, the Supreme Court has identified three factors significant to its 
analysis: the character of the governmental action, the regulation's 
economic impact on the claimant, and the extent to which the reg-
ulation has interfered with reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions. 106 In examining a regulation's character, the Court determines 
whether the regulation affects property interests in the same way 
as an act of eminent domain. 107 If the regulation prevents landowners 
from enjoying any substantial rights they hold in the property, in-
cluding the right to possess, use, dispose Of,108 and exclude others 
from the property,109 the Court likely will find that the regulation 
has taken that property. 110 
In evaluating the regulation's economic impact upon the claimant, 
the Court compares the property's value before and after the regu-
lation's interference. 111 The Court has not attempted to define, how-
ever, either how much decline in property value is necessary before 
a taking occurs or what portion of the property courts should con-
sider in determining the property's diminution in value. 112 Instead, 
the Court has chosen to conduct ad hoc, factual inquiries with respect 
to both the extent of the regulation's impact and the specific property 
to be considered in the valuation. 113 
The Court undertook such an inquiry in Keystone. 114 In considering 
the relevant mass of property to be valued, the Court refused to 
limit its analysis to the regulated parcel. 115 It explained that, by 
focusing on such a distinct segment of property, it almost certainly 
would find that the regulation had diminished the property's value 
completely.116 Although the Court explicitly refused to focus solely 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (75% diminution in value not a taking); 
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 414 (1915) (87.5% diminution in value not a taking). 
106 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 488-90. 
106 Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986). 
107 See supra note 74. 
108 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (citing United 
States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)). 
109 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979). 
110 See, e.g., Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441; Kaiser, 444 U.S. at 181. 
111 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987). 
112 See id. 
113 Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175; see also Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495. 
114 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495. 
115 Id. at 498-99. 
116 See id. at 498. 
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on the regulated parcel, it refrained from defining exactly what area 
to consider. Instead, it viewed the affected property as part of the 
claimant's total mining operations and investment expectations.ll7 
Since Keystone, the Supreme Court has remained flexible in its 
economic impact analysis, allowing lower courts to make their own 
case-by-case determinations of a regulation's affect on the economic 
viability of a claimant's property. 118 
Recently, the Court has found particular significance in the third 
factor of its regulatory taking analysis, the extent to which the 
regulation has interfered with the claimant's reasonable investment-
backed expectations.l19 In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto CO.,120 the 
Court focused at length on the foreseeability of existing statutory 
limitations in determining whether such limitations had interfered 
with the claimant's expectations. 121 The reasonableness of the claim-
ant's investment-backed expectations was so important to the M on-
santo Court that it decided the takings question based on this factor 
alone. 122 
In Monsanto, a pesticide producer, Monsanto Company, submitted 
confidential data regarding its products to the Environmental Pro-
117 [d. at 499. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan explained that, in considering a 
regulation's economic impact upon the claimant's property, courts should not divide a single 
parcel into discrete segments and determine whether rights in a particular segment have been 
abrogated. [d. at 497. Rather, according to Justice Brennan, courts should focus on the 
regulation's interference with rights in the "parcel as a whole." [d. (citing Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978». In his dissenting opinion, Justice 
Rehnquist argued that courts should focus upon the property segment that a regulation affects 
in determining the extent to which the regulation interferes with property interests. [d. at 
518 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis also diverged in 
their definitions of the parcel to be considered in a taking analysis. 260 U.S. 393, 414-20 
(1922). Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes focused his analysis solely on the regulated 
parcel. [d. at 414-15. Justice Brandeis compared the restricted segment to the value of the 
whole property. [d. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
The "parcel as a whole" issue remains widely debated by courts and commentators alike. 
See Michelman, supra note 83, at 1190-93; Rose, supra note 83, at 566-69; Sax, supra note 
83, at 60-61. 
118 See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986). 
119 See Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984). The reasonable investment-
backed expectation inquiry represents the equitable prong of the Court's regulatory taking 
analysis. See Michelman, supra note 83, at 1172. The role of equity traditionally has been to 
seek justice through fairness rather than through strictly formulated common law rules. [d. 
Thus, in determining whether a regulation effects a taking, courts ask not only how severely 
the regulation harmed a claimant, but also whether the claimant had good reason to expect 
compensation for what the government allegedly took. [d. 
120 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
121 [d. at 1005-15. 
122 [d. at 1005. 
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tection Agency (EPA) in order to obtain a registration to market 
the products. 123 At the time Monsanto submitted its data, a federal 
statute authorizing public disclosure of such data was in effect. When 
the EPA eventually did reveal Monsanto's data publicly, pursuant 
to the statute, Monsanto argued that the agency had taken its trade 
secrets, which are property interests under the Fifth Amendment. 
The Court determined that, because the federal statute existed at 
the time Monsanto submitted its data, the company could not have 
had a reasonable investment-backed expectation that the agency 
would keep the data confidential. 124 Presuming that Monsanto was 
on notice of the statute, the Court held that Monsanto could not 
argue that its reasonable investment-backed expectations were dis-
turbed when the government agency acted to use or disclose Mon-
santo's data in a manner authorized by law at the time Monsanto 
submitted the data. In the absence of any reasonable investment-
backed expectations, Monsanto's property could not be taken by the 
regulation's implementation. 125 
The Claims Court reached this same conclusion in two of its own 
decisions, Eastport Steamship Corp. v. United States126 and Allied-
General Nuclear Services v. United States. 127 In Eastport, decided 
before Monsanto, the Eastport Steamship Corporation purchased a 
ship from the United States Maritime Commission. 128 At the time of 
sale, the Commission stipulated that Eastport would need to obtain 
a license from the Commission if it later wished to sell the vessel to 
a foreign market. The Commission offered no assurance that it would 
grant the necessary license. Eastport eventually did try to sell the 
vessel, and when the Commission failed to grant it a license before 
the sale deadline, Eastport lost the sale and argued that the gov-
ernment had taken its property.129 The Claims Court held that the 
Commission's failure to grant Eastport a license could not amount 
to a compensable taking of Eastport's property, because the licensing 
process was pre-existing and known to Eastport when it initially 
purchased the property. 130 
In Allied-General, the Claims Court relied on the Supreme Court's 
standard enunciated in Monsanto, holding that a regulatory action 
123 ld. at 998. 
124 ld. at 1006-07. 
125 ld. at 1007. 
126 372 F.2d 1002 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
127 12 Cl. Ct. 372 (1987). 
128 Eastport, 372 F.2d at 1005. 
129 ld. at 1005-11. 
130 ld. at 1011. 
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involved considerations so foreseeable that the plaintiff, rather than 
the public, should bear the burden of the plaintiff's IOSS.131 Allied-
General Nuclear Services built a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant with 
hopes of profiting from future fuel sales. 132 At the time Allied-Gen-
eral purchased the property, federal statutes provided that the gov-
ernment would not license Allied-General's facility if the facility 
threatened public health or safety.133 When the government even-
tually refused to consider Allied-General's application for an oper-
ating permit for public safety reasons, Allied-General sued the gov-
ernment for taking its property without just compensation. 134 The 
court held that the government had not taken Allied-General's prop-
erty, and emphasized that it was aware of no case in which a court 
had found that the implementation of a regulatory scheme existing 
at the time a property interest was acquired effected a taking of the 
property interest. 135 
Rather than formulating a universal theory of the takings clause, 
courts instead have remained flexible in their approaches to regu-
latory takings claims. As the Supreme Court has explained, how-
ever, a balancing of private and public interests must occur in order 
to determine whether a regulation effects a taking. 136 If a regulation 
fails to advance a legitimate public purpose, a court should find a 
taking. 137 If compelling public interests are present, however, a court 
should be reluctant to find a taking. 138 Finally, if a claimant lacks 
reasonable investment-backed expectations, a court should not find 
a taking. 139 
V. SECTION 404 CASES IN THE CLAIMS COURT 
A. Early Cases 
The Claims Court first considered a section 404 takings challenge 
in Deltona Corp. v. United States. 140 In 1964, the Deltona Corpora-
tion purchased a 1O,000-acre parcel for $7.5 million, intending to 
131 Allied-General, 12 Cl. Ct. at 38l. 
132 [d. at 374. 
133 [d. at 38l. 
134 [d. at 375. 
135 [d. at 381 
136 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980). 
137 [d. at 260. 
136 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 493 (1987). 
139 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1006-07 (1984). 
140 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982). 
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develop a waterside residential community.141 Deltona divided its 
land into five parcels, which it planned to develop consecutively. The 
company was able to fill and develop the first two parcels by 1969, 
before Congress added the section 404 permit requirement to the 
CWA. In 1973, after the section 404 program became law, Deltona 
applied to the Corps for section 404 permits to fill its remaining three 
parcels. The Corps granted only one permit. Deltona sued the gov-
ernment in the Claims Court, arguing that by denying the company 
a section 404 permit, the government had taken its property without 
compensation. 142 Deltona explained to the court that it had entered 
into contracts of sale for approximately ninety percent of the lots in 
the two parcels for which the Corps denied fill permits. Without the 
permits, Deltona argued, it could not consummate its plans. The 
court disagreed, holding that the permit denials did not take Del-
tona's property. 143 
The Deltona court based its analysis on a two-part takings test 
that the Supreme Court used in Agins v. Tiburon, a 1980 land use 
case. 144 The court explained that an ordinance would amount to a 
taking if it did not substantially advance legitimate state interests, 
or if it denied property owners any economically viable use of their 
land. 145 
In applying this two-step approach, the Deltona court first ex-
amined section 404's legislative purpose. The court's conclusion was 
simple. It took "as given" that section 404, along with the rest of 
the CW A, substantially advanced legitimate and important federal 
interests. 146 
The court then considered the permit denial's impact on Deltona's 
property rights, examining the diminution in property value, the 
fairness of the regulation, and the reasonableness of Deltona's in-
vestment-backed expectations. 147 Quoting the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,148 the 
Claims Court explained that takings jurisprudence must focus on a 
regulation's interference with rights in "the parcel as a whole . ... "149 
141 Id. at 1188. 
142 Id. at 1189. 
143 Id. at 1194. 
144 Id. at 1191 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 1192. 
147 Id. at 1191-93. 
148 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
149 Deltona, 657 F.2d at 1192 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130-31) (emphasis in 
original). 
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Although the definition of the "whole parcel" a court should consider 
in its takings analysis has been debated widely,150 the Deltona court 
chose to compare the regulated portion of Deltona's parcel to the 
total acreage of Deltona's original purchase in 1964. 151 In doing so, 
the court found that the permit denial prevented Deltona from filling 
only twenty percent of its original purchase. 152 The court decided 
that mere diminution in property value alone was insufficient to 
establish a taking. 153 It concluded that the section 404 permit denial 
neither extinguished any fundamental attribute of ownershipl54 nor 
prevented Deltona from deriving other economically viable uses from 
the unregulated portions of its original parcel. 155 
In assessing the fairness of the regulation, the Deltona court 
emphasized that the Corps had been enforcing the section 404 permit 
program on a uniform basis nationwide. 156 Deltona therefore would 
share with other landowners both the benefits and the burdens of 
the section 404 program. These benefits were to be balanced against 
any diminution in market value that Deltona's property might suf-
fer. 157 
Finally, the court questioned the reasonableness of Deltona's orig-
inal development expectations. 158 When Deltona acquired its prop-
erty, it knew that it could not develop the land without the necessary 
permits from the Corps. 159 The court noted that Deltona must have 
been aware that the standards and conditions governing the issuance 
150 See supra note 117. 
151 See Deltona, 657 F.2d at 1192. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 1193 (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 131). 
154 Id. at 1192 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980)). The government 
argued that the property retained valuable incidents of ownership, including the right to use 
land in its current condition, the right to restrict or permit others' access to it, and the right 
to sell, lease, or give it away, in whole or in part. Id. 
155 See id. Seventy-seven percent of Deltona's developable lots were outside of the regulated 
parcel, including 111 acres of uplands whose total market value was approximately $2.5 million. 
Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id.; see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987). 
158 Deltona, 657 F.2d at 1193. The consideration of the claimant's development expectations 
became an important factor in the Supreme Court's takings analysis in Connolly v. Pension 
Benefit Guar. Corp. See 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986); see also supra notes 106, 119-35 and 
accompanying text. 
159 Deltona, 657 F.2d at 1193. The Corps initially had jurisdiction over Deltona's proposed 
dredge and fill activities through the Rivers and Harbors Act, because the activities affected 
"navigable waters of the United States" as defined in that Act. Id. at 1188 (citing 33 C.F.R. 
§ 322.2(a) (1980)). Because Deltona's proposed project also would take place in "navigable 
waters" as defined in FWPCA, Deltona was required after 1972 to obtain a § 404 permit from 
the Corps under that scheme as well. I d. 
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of permits could change. 160 Deltona only hoped to receive a permit; 
it was never assured of receiving one. 161 The court suggested that, 
because Deltona entered into its land sale contracts without reason-
able investment-backed expectations, the public should not have to 
bear responsibility for Deltona's losses resulting from the permit 
denial. 162 
The Deltona court concluded that the public interests that the 
section 404 permit denial advanced outweighed the private economic 
losses that Deltona suffered. 163 Because the permit denial prevented 
significant environmental harm, because the permit denial did not 
deprive Deltona of all uses of its property, and because Deltona 
lacked reasonable investment-backed expectations, the court found 
that no taking occurred. 164 
The Claims Court also rejected a plaintiff's section 404 takings 
challenge in Jentgen v. United States,165 decided on the same day as 
Deltona. The plaintiff, Jentgen, had purchased a 101.8-acre lakeside 
tract and, like Deltona, had planned to develop a water-oriented 
residential community.166 The Corps denied J entgen a permit to 
develop sixty of its eighty acres falling within the Corps's section 
404 jurisdiction. 167 
In deciding J entgen's takings claim, the court applied the same 
two-step test it used in Deltona, considering both whether the sec-
tion 404 regulation substantially advanced legitimate state interests 
and whether the regulation denied the plaintiff economically viable 
use of the land. 168 As in Deltona, the court assumed that the permit 
denial advanced legitimate public interests, and proceeded directly 
to the economic impact analysis. 169 Considering the regulation's ef-
fect on the parcel as a whole, the court compared the regulated 
sixty-acre portion of the parcel to the 101.8-acre parcel that Jentgen 
160 Id. at 1193. 
161 Id. The court explained that "Deltona had no assurance that the permits would issue, 
but only any expectation." Id. 
162 Id. at 1194. As the Deltona court explained, "[the plaintiff] certainly bears a great deal 
of responsibility for its current plight," having been warned of the possibility of future permit 
requirements. Id. 
168 Id. 
164 Id. at 1193-94. 
165 657 F.2d 1210 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982). 
166 See id. at 1212. 
167 I d. The remaining 20 acres were unregulated uplands and consequently needed no Corps 
authorization to be filled. I d. 
168 I d. at 1213. 
169 See id. at 1213-14. 
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originally purchased. 170 The unregulated portion retained a post-
denial market value of between $80,000 and $150,000; Jentgen had 
paid $150,000 for the property in 1971. The court found that enough 
economically viable uses remained for the unregulated portions of 
Jentgen's whole parcel to deny the takings claim. l7l 
Thus, land developers originally had great difficulty succeeding in 
their section 404 takings claims. In deciding its early section 404 
takings cases, such as Deltona and J entgen, the Claims Court ac-
knowledged that CWA section 404 substantially advances the pub-
lic's interest in protecting the environment; this interest weighed 
heavily in the court's analysis. Additionally, the court evaluated a 
permit denial's economic impact on a claimant in light of the claim-
ant's original property investment. Finally, the court reasoned that 
the government should not be forced to compensate claimants lacking 
reasonable investment expectations. 
B. Florida Rock, Loveladies Harbor, and Beyond 
In 1982, during the Reagan Administration, Congress reorganized 
the Claims Court under the Federal Courts Improvement Act.172 
Three years later, the Claims Court heard its first major section 404 
takings challenge since Deltona in Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. 
United States. 173 Like the plaintiffs in Deltona, Florida Rock Indus-
tries challenged a section 404 permit denial as a taking, arguing that 
the regulation left its property with no economically viable uses. 174 
The Claims Court's newly appointed chief judge175 decided the Flor-
ida Rock case, and under his analysis, the court found a taking. 176 
Florida Rock had purchased a 1560-acre tract of unimproved wet-
lands in 1972 for the sole purpose of extracting the parcel's limestone 
deposits. 177 In 1979,178 Florida Rock applied to the Corps for a section 
170 See id. at 1213. 
171 [d. at 1213-14. 
172 See infra note 8. 
173 8 Cl. Ct. 160 (1985), afl'd in part, vacated in part and remanded, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986), cen. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987), afl'd on remand, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990). 
174 Florida Rock, 8 Cl. Ct. at 164. 
175 Chief Judge Alex Kozinski. In the fall of 1982, President Reagan appointed Judge 
Kozinski chief judge of the newly created Claims Court for a 15-year term. See generally 
Mary Billard, Revitalizing a Judicial Backwater, THE AM. LAW., Jan. 1984, at 60, 6l. 
176 Florida Rock, 8 Cl. Ct. at 179. 
177 [d. at 162. 
178 Due to a serious downturn in the southern Florida building industry in the mid-1970s, 
Florida Rock did not begin mining until 1978. [d. at 163. 
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404 permit to mine ninety-eight acres of its tract.179 Florida Rock's 
proposed mining operation involved excavating the limestone rock 
at the bottom of its marshlands and placing the rock on the adjacent 
wetlands. The Corps denied the permit, finding that both the dump-
ing of the dredged rock and the excavation of the aquifer1so would 
pollute the water supply beneath Florida Rock's land. lSI Florida 
Rock argued that the permit denial amounted to a taking of its 
property, and the Claims Court agreed. 1s2 In an elaborate opinion, 
the court explained that not only had the regulation rendered Florida 
Rock's land commercially valueless, but also that the Corps's antic-
ipation that pollution would occur was unfounded. 1s3 
The Claims Court first examined Florida Rock's residual rights 
remaining in the property after the regulation. 1s4 While the Deltona 
court had determined that a section 404 permit denial did not extin-
guish fundamental attributes of ownership, lS5 the Florida Rock court 
considered such remaining ownership rights meaningless. 1s6 Exam-
ining next the regulated parcel's residual market value, the court 
attempted to distinguish earlier cases, including Deltona, noting that 
the property affected by the government's action in those cases 
continued to be available for productive economic activity.1s7 In con-
trast, the court explained, the regulated portion of Florida Rock's 
parcel had no economically viable uses other than rock mining. 188 
179 Id. Florida Rock intended to excavate limestone from all 1560 acres of its property. Id. 
The Corps, however, had advised prospective § 404 permit applicants that it would not consider 
applications that covered more than approximately three years of excavation. Id. 
180 I d. at 172. The limestone Florida Rock intended to mine was part of the Biscayne 
Aquifer, a vast deposit of porous rock underlying southern Florida and having the capacity to 
store a vast amount of fresh water within its pores. I d. A peat layer above the aquifer 
protected this water by filtering out contaminants seeping down from the atmosphere. Id. 
The mining operation would have removed this peat layer, exposing the aquifer to contami-
nation. Id. 
181 Id. at 171-74. This pollution was the sole basis for the Corps's jurisdiction over the 
plaintiff's wetlands. See id. at 163. The excavated rock fell under § 404's definition of "dredged 
and fill" material, and its deposit on the wetlands constituted pollution under the CWA. Id. 
at 171-72. Absent this pollution, "the preservation or destruction of the instant wetlands 
would [have been] a state or local issue only." Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 
F.2d 893, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987), aiI'd on remand, 21 Cl. 
Ct. 161 (1990); see supra note 42 and accompanying text discussing the Corps's scope of 
authority to regulate wetlands. 
182 Florida Rock, 8 Cl. Ct. at 164, 179. 
183 Id. at 171-75. 
184 Id. at 165-66. 
185 See supra note 154. 
186 Florida Rock, 8 Cl. Ct. at 166. The court considered rock mining the property's only 
economically viable use. Id. Other permissible uses, such as hunting and fishing, "would not 
yield sufficient income to cover even real estate taxes." I d. at 164. 
187 Id. at 167. 
188 I d. at 166. 
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Finally, the Claims Court questioned the legitimacy of the Corps's 
permit denial. 189 The government argued that it had denied the 
section 404 permit because Florida Rock's proposed mining would 
cause pollution. l90 The government contended that it could prohibit 
such "noxious" property use without paying compensation. 191 The 
Claims Court conceded that the government could prohibit any vi-
able economic uses of the property without paying compensation, if 
such uses would cause pollution. 192 After extensive examination of 
testimony from a Corps expert, however, the court found insufficient 
evidence to conclude that the proposed mining operation would pol-
lute the adjacent water supply.193 Therefore, the court concluded 
that the government's only purpose in denying Florida Rock a sec-
tion 404 permit was to preserve wetlands for their environmental 
and aesthetic values. 194 The court maintained that the public's inter-
est in environmental and aesthetic values should be viewed as a 
public benefit that is widely shared and therefore must be publicly 
financed. 195 Accordingly, the court held that the Corps's permit de-
nial had taken Florida Rock's property in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment. 196 
Florida Rock was the first case in which the Claims Court found 
a taking resulting from a section 404 permit denial, and the first 
section 404 takings case to go to the Federal Circuit on appeal. 197 
The Federal Circuit reviewed the Claims Court's investigation of 
the project's potential pollution and the court's economic impact 
analysis. 198 The Federal Circuit agreed that a section 404 permit 
denial may amount to a taking, but vacated the Claims Court's 
finding that Florida Rock's mining activity would not pollute the 
waters surrounding its property. 199 The Federal Circuit admonished 
189 [d. at 171-75. 
190 I d. at 169. 
191 [d. at 170 (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887». 
192 [d. at 171. 
193 [d. at 171-75. 
194 [d. at 176. 
196 [d. (citing Maine v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970». 
196 [d. at 179. 
197 See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987), aiI'd on remand, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990); see supra notes 65-67 
and accompanying text discussing Claims Court appeals to the Federal Circuit. 
198 Florida Rock, 791 F.2d at 898-905. 
199 [d. at 905. The court held that Florida Rock's election to bring a Tucker Act action 
amounted to a concession that the Corps had jurisdiction and the proposed activity would 
cause water pollution; that a valid regulation may amount to a taking; that in determining 
whether there had been a diminution in market value that amounted to a taking, the Claims 
Court should have considered the property's fair market value based on potential sales to 
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the Claims Court for questioning the Corps's premises for denying 
Florida Rock a section 404 permit.2°O Because Florida Rock elected 
to sue for compensation in the Claims Court, it effectively had con-
ceded that the permit denial itself was a valid regulatory action. 201 
Thus, the Claims Court should have relied on the Corps's belief that 
pollution would occur. 202 
Although it acknowledged that Florida Rock's mining operation 
would pollute the water supply, the Federal Circuit rejected the 
government's contention that this pollution would harm the public. 203 
Relying on the Army district engineer's failure to establish that the 
potential pollution was very serious, the Federal Circuit dismissed 
the pollution incident to Florida Rock's mining as harmless. Using 
what amounted to a harmlbenefit analysis,204 the Federal Circuit 
ultimately reached the same conclusion as the Claims Court regard-
ing the regulation's purpose: that the Corps's reason for denying 
Florida Rock a section 404 permit was not to prevent harm to the 
environment, but to provide a benefit to the public by preserving 
wetlands for their aesthetic and recreational values.205 According to 
the court, because the public would benefit from the wetlands, the 
public should share the expense of maintaining them. 206 
those who would be willing to speculate; and that the Claims Court properly refused to 
determine that a permit denial for 98 acres also took land in excess of those 98 acres. See id. 
200 Id. at 897. The Corps only may deny a § 404 permit upon finding that the applicant's 
proposed activity will impact the environment adversely. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1988). The 
Federal Circuit recognized the flaw in the Claims Court's logic in validating the permit denial: 
"[The Claims Court] had previously determined that the denial was 'a proper exercise of 
statutory and regulatory authority' which it could hardly have been if the engineers had not 
reasonably anticipated that some pollution would occur .... " Florida Rock, 791 F.2d at 897. 
201 [d. at 899. 
202 See id. at 897. 
203 I d. at 904. 
204 See id. Although the Federal Circuit did not say so explicitly, it used a harmlbenefit 
analysis in determining § 404's legitimacy. See id. Under this approach, a court examines the 
nature of the use that the government regulation adversely affects to determine whether it 
is noxious, wrongful, harmful, or prejudicial to the health, safety, or morals of the public. See, 
e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887). If the use to which persons intend to put 
their property is harmful, then the government validly may regulate that use and thereby 
decrease the property's value without compensating the property owners. If, however, the 
intended property use will not harm the public, but rather the regulation itself will benefit 
the public, then the government must compensate the party adversely affected by the regu-
lation. Stated another way, "the state takes property by eminent domain because it is useful 
to the public, and under the police power because it is harmful to the public." ERNST FREUND, 
THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 546-47 (1904). 
205 Florida Rock, 791 F.2d at 904. 
206 Id. 
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The Federal Circuit remanded Florida Rock to the Claims Court 
to determine the exact diminution in value of Florida Rock's parcel 
and decide whether this diminution was severe enough to effect a 
taking. 207 The Claims Court determined the regulation's economic 
impact by comparing the property's fair market value before the 
permit denial with its value after the denial. 208 The court focused 
solely on the ninety-eight acres that the section 404 regulation af-
fected; it did not consider the unregulated portion of Florida Rock's 
total 1560-acre parcel. 209 As a result, the court found that the permit 
denial diminished the ninety-eight acre parcel's value by ninety-five 
percent, and concluded that a taking had occurred. 210 The Claims 
Court ordered the government to pay Florida Rock $1,029,000 for 
the ninety-eight acres of wetlands. 211 
While the Federal Circuit never actually decided the takings ques-
tion in Florida Rock, the Claims Court used principles from the 
Federal Circuit's opinion as binding precedent to justify its decision 
in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States. 212 In Loveladies, the 
government moved for summary judgment, and the claimant cross-
moved for partial summary judgment, on the issue of whether the 
Corps's refusal to grant a section 404 permit was a taking.213 The 
court indicated that the permit denial was a taking, but concluded 
that it could not resolve the issue on summary judgment and ordered 
a trial on the merits. 214 
In 1956, Loveladies Harbor, Inc. had purchased for $300,000 ap-
proximately 250 acres of vacant land for the construction of residen-
tial homes.215 Much of this property was wetlands that Loveladies 
had to fill before developing. By 1972, Loveladies had filled and 
developed 199 acres, and by 1982, it had sold most of these acres to 
the pUblic. In 1981, Loveladies applied for a section 404 permit to 
207 [d. at 905. 
208 See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 171-74 (1990). 
209 See id. at 175. 
210 [d. at 175-76. The court determined that the property's value before the permit denial 
was $10,500 per acre; the value after the permit denial was $500 per acre. [d. at 176. 
211 [d. 
212 15 Cl. Ct. 381 (1988). The Loveladies court explained that "[t]he Federal Circuit's 
balancing of governmental and private interests in Florida Rock ... should not be ignored 
but instead should be created as one of those binding 'right principles' enunciated by the 
court." [d. at 389. 
213 [d. 
214 [d. at 399. 
215 [d. at 383. 
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fill 11.5216 of its remaining fifty-one acres subject to the section 404 
regulation. 217 After the Corps denied the permit application, Love-
ladies sought to have the permit denial overturned in the federal 
district and appellate courtS. 218 When neither court would invalidate 
the Corps's decision, Loveladies sued for compensation in the Claims 
Court. 219 
The Claims Court began its analysis with the "substantial advance-
ment test" used in prior decisions. 220 Balancing the governmental 
interest in preserving wetlands under section 404 against the inter-
ference with Loveladies' property rights, the court rejected the 
Deltona court's finding that the section 404 regulation substantially 
advances legitimate federal interests. 221 The court looked instead to 
the Federal Circuit's Florida Rock decision, which found the balance 
in favor of the landowner, because, in the Federal Circuit's opinion, 
section 404 was not enacted to prevent environmental harm, but 
rather to maintain a public benefit.222 Although the Loveladies court 
rejected the Florida Rock harmlbenefit distinction as a useful 
method for determining a takings issue,223 it did accept the Federal 
Circuit's conclusion that a section 404 permit denial can fail to ad-
vance legitimate public interests. 224 The court intimated that it could 
find a taking based solely on the lack of legitimate governmental 
interests, though it ultimately considered this as only one factor in 
its determination. 225 
The Loveladies court then analyzed whether the permit denial 
deprived Loveladies of all economically viable use of its property. 226 
216 [d. at 384. By obtaining a § 404 permit to fill 11.5 acres, Loveladies would have been 
able to develop both the 11.5 acres of wetlands and one acre of adjacent unregulated uplands. 
[d. 
217 [d. Loveladies had difficulty developing its remaining 51 acres as a result of both § 404 
and a state wetlands regulation, both which were enacted in the early 1970s. [d. 
218 Id. 
219 [d. at 384. 
220 [d. at 388. See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160, 165 (1985), 
aff'd in part, vacated in part and remanded, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), eert. denied, 479 
U.S. 1053 (1987), afi'd on remand, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990); Jentgen v. United States, 657 F.2d 
1210, 1213 (Ct. Cl. 1981), eert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 
657 F.2d 1184, 1191 (Ct. Cl. 1981), eert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982). 
221 Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 388, 390. 
222 See id. at 389 (citing Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 904 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986), eert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987), afi'd on remand, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990)). 
223 [d. at 389-90. The Loveladies court explained that "[tjhe problem with the hannlbenefit 
distinction is that it is often difficult to differentiate between the situation where the govern-
ment is acting to preserve benefits from [sic] the situation where the government is acting to 
prevent harm." [d. at 389. 
224 [d. at 390. 
226 [d. 
226 [d. at 390-93. The factors that the Loveladies court considered were those that the 
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Central to the dispute in this case was what portion of the property 
the court should consider as the "whole parcel"227 for purposes of 
measuring the severity of the regulation's impact and the frustration 
of the landowner's investment-backed expectations.228 The govern-
ment argued that Loveladies' original purchase should comprise the 
"parcel as a whole," as the Deltona court had held. 229 Thus, the 
government urged, the court should compare the value remaining in 
the 11.5 regulated acres with the value derived from the unregulated 
portions of Loveladies' original 250-acre purchase. 230 
While the Deltona court had used the government's suggested 
approach, the Loveladies court instead focused solely on the 11.5 
contiguous acres and one acre of uplands affected by the regula-
tion.231 Based on its interpretation of the Supreme Court's recent 
decision in Keystone, the Loveladies court began by restricting its 
analysis to the 57.4 acres that the plaintiff owned when the taking 
occurred.232 The court then went beyond Keystone by arguing that 
not all properties held at the time of the taking always can be 
considered as part of the parcel as a whole.233 Subsequently, the 
court refused to consider 38.5 of these 57.4 acres because the Corps 
almost certainly would deny a permit to develop those areas. 234 
Finally, the court excluded 6.4 of the remaining 18.9 acres from 
Federal Circuit used in Florida Rock: the character of the governmental action, the regula-
tion's economic impact on the claimant, and the extent to which the regulation interfered with 
the claimant's reasonable investment-backed expectations. Florida Rock, 791 F.2d at 901 
(citing Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,224-25 (1986». 
22"1 See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text discussing the problems with defining 
the "parcel as a whole." 
228 Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 391. 
229 [d. at 392. 
230 [d. 
231 See 15 Cl. Ct at 392. While the Corps denied permits for only 11.5 acres of the Loveladies' 
land, Loveladies argued that the government also had taken one acre of filled upland outside 
the Corps's jurisdiction, because the restriction imposed on the surrounding wetlands cut off 
all access routes to the upland property. [d. at 384. 
232 [d. In defining the parcel as a whole, the Claims Court concluded that, 
on the basis of Keystone, this court cannot include the value of all of the property 
originally purchased as the parcel as a whole. Instead, this court must limit its focus 
upon the value of that property which the plaintiffs held when the taking was said 
to have occurred. This property amounted to 57.4 acres out of the original 250 acre 
parcel. 
[d. at 392. 
233 [d. at 392-93. 
234 [d. at 393. The court noted that the Federal Circuit in Florida Rock excluded from its 
analysis 1462 acres of Florida Rock's total 1560 acres, because Florida Rock almost certainly 
would be unable to obtain the permits it needed to use the 1462 acres. [d. at 392 (citing 
Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 721 F.2d 893,904-05 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 1053 (1987), aff'd on remand, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990». 
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consideration, because these 6.4 acres were no longer contiguous 
with the 12.5 acres at issue.235 
The Claims Court did not decide the takings question in Loveladies 
until it tried the case in 1990.236 At this trial, the court focused solely 
on the 12.5 acres that the permit denial affected.237 The court found 
that the Corps's permit denial had diminished the value of this 12.5 
acre parcel by ninety-nine percent, and held that this diminution 
was a taking.238 The court ordered the government to pay Loveladies 
almost $2.6 million for the 11.5-acre parcel. 239 
The Claims Court again questioned the legitimacy of section 404 
in Ciampetti v. United States. 240 Through a series of purchases be-
ginning in 1980, the plaintiff had acquired a tract of property for 
development of an oceanside community.241 In 1986, the Corps denied 
the plaintiff a permit to fill a portion of this tract that fell within 
section 404 jurisdiction.242 The court proceeded to analyze the plain-
tiff's takings claim as it had in Florida Rock and Loveladies, consid-
ering the character of the governmental activity, the extent of the 
property value's diminution, and the frustration of the plaintiff's 
investment-backed expectations. 243 Lacking sufficient information 
about the property purchases, the court declined to define the parcel 
relevant to the economic impact analysis, and deferred the decision 
on the takings question for a later trial. 244 
The court, however, was able to rule on the government's sum-
mary judgment motion by considering the first two factors of its 
takings analysis. 245 Examining the character of the section 404 reg-
236 [d. at 393 (citing American Say. & Loan Ass'n v. County of Marin, 653 F.2d 364, 369 
(9th Cir. 1981) (courts should not consider physically non-adjacent property as part of single 
parcel as whole just because plaintiff formerly owned property at one time». 
236 See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990). When the Claims 
Court first heard this case, it only ruled on the government's motion for summary judgment 
and the property owner's cross-motion for partial summary judgment. The court denied both 
motions. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 399 (1988). 
237 Loveladies, 21 Cl. Ct. at 154. 
238 [d. at 160-61. 
239 [d. at 161. The court also ordered the government to pay interest from the time of the 
taking. [d. 
240 18 Cl. Ct. 548 (1989). The lead plaintiff's name is misspelled as "Ciampetti" in the caption 
of the Claims Court's opinion. [d. All other opinions in this case's prior history use the correct 
spelling, "Ciampitti." E.g., United States v. Ciampitti, 669 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.J. 1987); United 
States v. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483 (D. N.J. 1984). 
241 Ciampetti, 18 Cl. Ct. at 550. 
242 [d. at 552. 
243 [d. at 556-59. 
244 [d. at 559. 
246 [d. at 556-59. 
1991] CLAIMS COURT 345 
ulation, the court rejected the government's argument that the se-
rious health effects associated with the plaintiff's proposed project 
brought it within the "nuisance exception" to the Fifth Amendment 
takings clause.246 Citing both Florida Rock and Loveladies, the court 
considered the public interests advanced by the section 404 regula-
tion insubstantial compared to the private interests that the permit 
denial affected. 247 
The government also argued that, because the plaintiff was fully 
aware of the federal permit requirements when he purchased his 
land in 1980, he could not have reasonably expected to develop his 
property without first obtaining the requisite permits.248 The court 
declined to find for the government on this basis alone, intimating 
that if the permit denial's economic impact on the plaintiff's property 
was severe enough, the fact that the plaintiff should have foreseen 
the permit denial when he purchased his property would not prevent 
the court from finding a taking. 249 
Since it heard its first section 404 case in 1981,250 the Claims Court 
has changed its analysis of section 404 takings challenges dramati-
cally. Where the court once presumed that the section 404 program 
substantially advanced legitimate public interests in preventing en-
vironmental harm,251 it now finds that section 404 permit denials 
"lack" such interests. 252 Where the court once considered a permit 
denial's economic impact upon claimants in light of the uses the 
claimants derived from unregulated portions of their original prop-
erty interests,253 the court now limits its economic impact analysis 
solely to the claimants' contiguous property held when the Corps 
denied the claimants a section 404 permit. 254 Finally, where the court 
once maintained that the public should not have to bear responsibility 
for the claimants' loss when the claimants lacked reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations,255 the court now suggests that it may find 
246 [d. at 556-57. 
247 [d. at 557 n.14. 
248 [d. at 557. 
249 [d. at 558. According to the court, "Keystone suggests that the reasonable investment-
backed expectations analysis is but one of three relevant inquiries. While knowledge about 
permitting difficulties may indeed weigh against plaintiffs in this case, that is certainly not 
the only factor to consider in the constitutional balance." [d. 
250 See Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Cl. Ct. 1981), eert. denied, 455 U.S. 
1017 (1982). 
251 [d. at 1192. 
252 See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 390 (1988). 
253 See Deltona, 657 F.2d at 1192. 
254 See Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 392. 
255 Deltona, 657 F.2d at 1194. 
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a taking even where the claimants foresaw the possibility of a future 
section 404 permit denial when they purchased their property. 256 
VI. THE CLAIMS COURT'S CURRENT 404 TAKINGS ANALYSIS: 
WHY IT Is FLAWED AND How IT SHOULD CHANGE 
While there is no one "right" formula for determining when a 
regulation effects a taking, the Claims Court's new section 404 tak-
ings analysis is flawed for three reasons. First, the court has lost 
sight of section 404's original purpose. The court appears to regard 
section 404 only as a means by which the government can preserve 
wetlands for their aesthetic and recreational benefits. This interpre-
tation is incorrect. Congress enacted section 404 to prevent water 
pollution and environmental harm. By refusing to consider this goal 
adequately, the Claims Court has found the legitimate federal inter-
ests advanced by the section 404 program to be lacking, when in fact 
these interests are both present and compelling. 
Second, in analyzing a section 404 permit denial's economic impact 
upon a plaintiff's property, the Claims Court has misread the Su-
preme Court's Keystone opinion regarding what constitutes the 
"whole parcel" that courts should consider in takings cases. The 
Claims Court has limited its analysis to the regulated parcel itself. 
The Keystone Court specifically stated, however, that courts should 
not so severely restrict their takings analyses. 257 
Finally, the Claims Court is unreasonable in suggesting that it 
still may find a compensable taking even absent a claimant's rational 
investment-backed expectations. If the court were to find a taking 
under such circumstances, it would promote a poor policy and would 
contradict both its own holdings and Supreme Court precedent. 
A. Section 404 Substantially Advances Legitimate Public 
Interests 
Over the past decade, the Claims Court virtually has reversed its 
opinion of the section 404 program. In Deltona, the Claims Court 
acknowledged the CWA's goal of eliminating water pollution258 and 
recognized section 404 as a valuable means of realizing this legislative 
goal. 259 The court presumed that section 404 permit denials advanced 
256 Ciampetti v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 548, 558 (1989). 
257 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 498-99 (1987). 
258 Deltona, 657 F.2d at 1187. 
259 See id. at 1192. 
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the public interest by preventing activities that degraded water 
quality and harmed the ecosystem. 260 In Florida Rock, the Claims 
Court abandoned this presumption. 261 Instead, the court extensively 
questioned the Corps about the potential pollution its permit denial 
would prevent, and ultimately concluded-incorrectly, according to 
the Federal Circuit262-that Florida Rock's proposed rock mining 
operation would not pollute the water supply.263 In Loveladies, the 
Claims Court did not even venture to ask the Corps about its findings 
regarding the potential environmental harm that the plaintiff's pro-
posed activity would cause. 264 Rather, the court simply assumed that, 
if Florida Rock's excavation of its wetlands would not cause severe 
pollution, then Loveladies' mere filling of its wetlands should cause 
even less pollution. 265 The Claims Court now apparently presumes 
that the section 404 permit program simply does not promote legit-
imate federal interests. 266 
Based on past court decisions, however, section 404 does substan-
tially advance legitimate public interests. 267 The objectives of the 
section 404 program are those of the CW A itself: to eliminate water 
pollution and protect the ecosystem. 268 The fundamental policy un-
derlying the section 404 permit guidelines is to prevent the environ-
mental despoilment that results from water pollution. 269 The Su-
preme Court, federal courts, and state courts long have recognized 
such governmental purposes as legitimate. 270 
The Federal Circuit's own reasoning in Florida Rock shows that 
a section 404 permit denial does substantially advance section 404's 
purpose of preventing environmental harm. The Federal Circuit held 
260 See id. 
261 See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160, 173 (1985), afi'd in part, 
vacated in part and remanded, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cm. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 
(1987), aff'd on remand, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990). 
262 See Florida Rock, 791 F.2d at 897. 
263 Florida Rock, 8 Cl. Ct. at 175. 
264 See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 389 (1988). 
266 [d. 
266 See id. at 390. 
267 See, e.g., Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1192 (Cl. Ct. 1981), cert. 
denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982). 
268 See supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text. 
269 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (1990) (interpreting the National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1988)). 
270 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 492 (1987); Miller 
v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 
373 (1926); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,668-69 (1887); American Dredging v. Dutchyshyn, 
480 F. Supp. 957, 960-61 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Smithwick v. Alexander, 17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 
2127,2131 (E.D.N.C. 1981), afi'd, 17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2131 (4th Cir. 1981). 
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that a claimant's choice to sue in the Claims Court amounts to a 
concession that the Corps's permit denial is valid.271 If the claimant's 
proposed activities would not cause water pollution, the Corps would 
have no statutory authority to act.272 In other words, as the Deltona 
court originally recognized, the Claims Court must accept that, in 
the section 404 takings cases it hears, permit denials do advance 
legitimate governmental interests. If these permit denials were not 
reasonably related to the accomplishment of section 404's purported 
goal, the claimant would not sue for compensation in the Claims 
Court; rather, the claimant would bring an action in a federal district 
court to have the permit denial itself invalidated. 273 
The Claims Court's failure to accord significant weight to the 
public interests that the section 404 program advances ignores both 
its own precedent and the line of Supreme Court decisions reaffirm-
ing the important role the public interest plays in the Court's own 
takings analysis. 274 In failing to recognize the governmental interests 
involved in the section 404 program, the Claims Court has skewed 
the balance of public and private interests unfairly in favor of private 
development. 
B. In Deciding Section .40.4 Takings Cases, the Claims Court Must 
Not Restrict Its Economic Impact Analysis Too Narrowly 
The Claims Court also has shown an undue bias towards landown-
ers in its consideration of a section 404 permit denial's economic 
impact upon a plaintiff's property. Specifically, the court has confined 
its takings analysis to the regulated parcel and the adjoining prop-
erty that the plaintiff held when the Corps denied the section 404 
permit. By so restricting its analysis, the court has enabled land-
owners to manipulate their property holdings virtually in order to 
ensure that the court will find a taking. 
The Loveladies court concluded that the Keystone decision re-
quired it to compare the post-regulation value of the regulated parcel 
271 Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986), eert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987), aff'd on remand, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990). 
272 See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. 
2'll! See, e.g., 1902 Atlantic Ltd. v. Hudson, 574 F. Supp. 1381, 1406 (E.D. Va. 1983) (court 
found Corps's permit denial arbitrary and capricious); see also notes 52-54 and accompanying 
text. 
274 See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488 (1987); 
Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1192 (Cl. Ct. 1981), eert. denied, 455 U.S. 
1017 (1982). 
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with the value of the property that the plaintiff owned when the 
alleged taking occurred, not with the value of the parcel that the 
plaintiff orginally purchased. 275 In fact, Keystone does not support 
that reasoning. The Keystone Court never stated that the economic 
viability test always involves a consideration of the property value 
at the time of an alleged taking.276 Rather, the Court specifically 
declined to define the relevant mass of property that a court should 
consider in analyzing a regulation's economic impact. The Court 
emphasized that a court must consider the regulated property in the 
light of the plaintiffs' total operations, and suggested that a flexible, 
case-by-case analysis was necessary. 277 
In Loveladies, the plaintiff's original purchase was relevant to the 
economic impact analysis. Loveladies purchased a 250-acre parcel 
and successfully developed and sold 199 of these acres. 278 The Corps's 
permit denial prevented Loveladies from developing twelve acres-
five percent of its original purchase. 279 If the court had considered 
the return that Loveladies received on its original investment, it 
probably would not have found that the Corps's permit denial se-
verely thwarted Loveladies' profit expectations. 
Moreover, by so limiting its analysis, the Claims Court allows 
savvy developers to manipulate their property holdings to isolate 
the regulated parcel. According to the Loveladies decision, as long 
as the property included in the permit application falls entirely 
within the Corps's jurisdiction, and as long as the applicant owns no 
other adjacent property at the time of the Corps's decision, the court 
almost certainly will find a taking if the Corps denies the applicant 
a section 404 permit.280 Thus, before applying for a section 404 
permit, developers simply can transfer title to any of their unregu-
lated property, leaving only the regulated parcel in their own name. 
If the Claims Court adheres to its limited definition of the "whole 
parcel," it will focus solely on the regulated parcel. As the Keystone 
Court warned, by so restricting its focus, a court will surely find a 
near-lOO% property value diminution resulting from the regula-
tion.281 
275 Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 392 (1988). 
276 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 470-506. 
277 [d. at 499. 
278 Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 383. 
279 Loveladies, 21 Cl. Ct. at 161. 
280 [d. 
281 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 499. 
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C. Plaintiffs Who Lack Reasonable Investment-Backed 
Expectations Should Not Succeed in Their Section 404 Takings 
Claims 
In Ciampetti, the Claims Court explained that it may find a taking 
even if, upon acquiring his property, the claimant foresaw the pos-
sibility of a future section 404 permit denial. 282 Such a finding would 
set a poor policy precedent and would be inconsistent with recent 
holdings of both the Supreme Court and the Claims Court. 
Compensating plaintiffs such as the developer in Ciampetti re-
wards them for their unreasonable expectations. Should the Claims 
Court find a taking when it tries the Ciampetti case, its decision 
would enable developers to buy foreseeably regulated land and yet 
still win a takings claim. Rather than risking an inadequate return 
on their investment by actually marketing the property themselves, 
developers instead simply can wait for the Corps to deny them a 
section 404 permit, and then sue the government for compensation. 
If the developers win their takings claims, they could earn a profit 
without ever having to touch their land-all courtesy of the public 
fisc. 
Moreover, both the Supreme Court in Monsanto and the Claims 
Court in Eastport and Allied-General held that, in the absence of 
reasonable investment-backed expectations, a claimant cannot argue 
that the government has taken its property.283 If the Claims Court 
now finds a taking where the claimant purchased its property while 
on notice of section 404, the ruling would contradict both the Su-
preme Court's precedent established in Monsanto and the Claims 
Court's own decisions in Eastport and Allied-General. 
D. A Proper Section 404 Takings Analysis 
There is no universal analysis that courts apply to regulatory 
takings claims. 284 As the Supreme Court has admitted, the question 
necessarily involves a balancing of public and private interests.285 In 
considering the public interest involved, the Court examines 
whether the interest itself is "legitimate," and if so, whether the 
regulation "substantially advances" this interest.286 In determining 
the regulation's effect on a property's economic viability, the Court 
282 Ciampetti v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 548, 558 (1989). 
288 See supra notes 119--'l5 and accompanying text. 
284 See note 83 discussing takings jurisprudence. 
286 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980). 
286 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987). 
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has identified three factors as significant to a regulatory takings 
analysis: the character of the governmental regulation, the regula-
tion's economic impact upon the claimant, and the extent to which 
the regulation has interfered with the claimant's reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations.287 
In analyzing a section 404 takings challenge, the Claims Court 
should consider these factors while making certain assumptions. As 
a threshold issue, the court should determine whether, at the time 
the claimant purchased the property in question, the section 404 
regulation was reasonably foreseeable. If the claimant purchased the 
property after section 404's 1972 enactment,288 the court should pre-
sume that the claimant had notice of the section 404 regulation and 
the possibility of a permit denial. If the claimant acquired the prop-
erty before section 404's enactment, the government should have 
the burden of proving that the claimant was on notice of the forth-
coming regulations. If the court establishes that the claimant was 
on notice of section 404, such notice then would render unreasonable 
the claimant's expectations of developing its property without a 
permit. Following the Supreme Court's precedent in Monsanto, and 
its own precedent in Allied-General, the Claims Court should deny 
compensation to any claimant that lacks reasonable investment-
backed expectations. 
If the court finds the claimant did have reasonable investment-
backed expectations, it should proceed to balance the public and 
private interests involved. The court should presume, as it did in 
Deltona, that section 404 substantially advances legitimate and im-
portant public interests in preventing environmental harm. This 
presumption would properly reflect the goals of the section 404 
program and significantly counterbalance the private claimant's in-
terest in profiting from its regulated property. The court then should 
evaluate the losses the claimant has suffered from the regulated 
portion of its property in light of the uses the claimant has derived 
from the unregulated portions of its original property investment. 
By following this analysis, the court better can determine the extent 
to which the claimant's initial investment expectations have been 
frustrated. 
This approach to resolving section 404 takings claims has several 
benefits. First, it is less partial than the Claims Court's current 
approach. It acknowledges the strength and importance of the com-
287 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
288 Congress enacted the CWA, including § 404, on October 18, 1972. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1376 (1988). 
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peting interests involved in a section 404 takings claim-both the 
private landowner's interest and the public interest. Additionally, 
by recognizing the compelling public interest in preventing the 
harms that water pollution causes, this approach is consistent with 
the goals of the section 404 program. Finally, this approach will send 
potential claimants the message that ignorance of the law will not 
be rewarded. Developers investing in heavily-regulated wetlands do 
so at their own risk; when foreseeable restrictions thwart their 
investment-backed expectations, they alone-not the public-should 
pay. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In deciding section 404 takings challenges, the United States 
Claims Court has skewed its analysis unduly in favor of the private 
developer in three ways. First, the court has considered section 404 
a means of preserving wetlands merely for their aesthetic values 
and has concluded that such a regulation does not advance any 
legitimate federal interest. Thus, at the outset of a section 404 
takings case, the court assumes that there is no legitimate public 
interest to be balanced against the private interest at stake. Second, 
the Claims Court further has biased its approach towards the private 
landowner by focusing its economic impact analysis solely on the 
contiguous property that claimants owned when the Corps denied 
them a section 404 permit. Third, the court has suggested that it 
would compensate even those claimants who had no reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations whatsoever. 
The Claims Court's current takings analysis is flawed. The court 
has failed to recognize the legitimate federal interests that the sec-
tion 404 program advances. Congress enacted section 404 to help 
prevent water pollution and environmental harm, not merely to 
provide aesthetic benefits to the public. Thus, while section 404's 
legitimate public purpose should weigh heavily in the Claims Court's 
analysis, the court instead has undervalued the public interest at 
stake in section 404 takings cases. Additionally, the court has mis-
read the Supreme Court's decision in Keystone and violated its own 
precedent by limiting too narrowly the property it considers in its 
economic impact analysis. In doing so, the Claims Court has provided 
a takings test that any shrewd developer easily can pass. Finally, 
the court has contradicted its own holdings and Supreme Court 
precedent by suggesting that it would find a taking even absent a 
claimant's reasonable investment-backed expectations. 
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Justice Holmes viewed the takings problem as a manifestation of 
social conflict.289 As Holmes saw it, the law's job is to assure that 
the war of competing interests is waged fairly and equally.290 The 
Claims Court's current approach to section 404 takings claims is 
neither fair nor equitable. By refusing to consider the important 
environmental interests that the section 404 program advances, by 
unduly restricting its economic impact analysis, and by disregarding 
even unreasonable investment-backed expectations in its analysis, 
the Claims Court has not even allowed the public interest onto the 
battlefield. 
289 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
290 OLIVER W. HOLMES, The Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 25,27 (1920). 
